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MONETARY REMEDIES FOR VICTIMS 
DURING ILLINOIS CRIMINAL CASES 
Jeffrey A. Parness, Laura Lee, and Karen Blouin* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In 1992, Illinois voters overwhelmingly added a constitutional bill of 
rights for crime victims,1 joining several other American states with 
express constitutional protections.2  Most American state constitutional 
provisions have only been enacted recently, reflecting state public 
policies increasing respect for crime victims during criminal cases. 
The tenth (and last) enumerated right in the Illinois Crime Victim’s 
Rights Amendment is the “right to restitution.”3  Restitution is but one 
form of monetary remedy available to crime victims.4  Other remedies 
include monies beyond restitution paid by criminal offenders and 
monies paid to crime victims by governments. 
Express constitutional rights, such as this right to restitution, need 
not be accompanied by corresponding legislation.  Implementing 
legislation is unnecessary where the constitutional right is self-executing.  
The Illinois crime victim provisions do not contain, however, rights 
enforceable without General Assembly action.  Rather, crime victim 
rights are to be provided by law.5  Nevertheless, they are specially 
addressed in the constitution, denoting enhanced importance.  The ten 
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1 Editorial, The Rights of Victims—And Others, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 16, 1992 at 
2B [hereinafter Rights of Victims]. 
2 National Victims’ Constitutional Amendment Passage, http://www.nvcap.org (last 
visited Mar. 8, 2009) (click state vras link in the index on the left side of the website). 
3 ILL. CONST. art I, § 8.1(a)(10). 
4 See, e.g., Note, Victim Restitution in the Criminal Process:  A Procedural Analysis, 97 
HARV. L. REV. 931, 932–33 (1984) (reviewing varying forms of criminal case restitution 
orders, recognizing civil trial processes for crime victim recoveries, and opining that “civil 
process safeguards are undesirable as well as unnecessary” for criminal case restitution 
orders). 
5 ILL. CONST. art I, § 8.1(a) (“Crime victims, as defined by law, shall have the following 
rights . . .”); id. § 8.1(b) (“The General Assembly may provide by law for the enforcement of 
this Section.”).  See also id. § 8.1(c) (“The General Assembly may provide for an assessment 
against convicted defendants to pay for crime victims’ rights.”). 
Parness et al.: Monetary Remedies for Victims During Illinois Criminal Cases
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2009
70 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44 
crime victims’ rights, including restitution, should be glorified, not 
trivialized, by legislators. 
While crime victim restitution is addressed legislatively, many 
Illinois crime victims receive few or no monetary remedies.  This Article 
examines the deficiencies in current Illinois laws on monetary remedies 
for crime victims during criminal cases.  These failures undermine the 
desires of the electorate in 1992.  This Article suggests reforms after 
examining experiences in other American states.  In particular, it urges 
that monetary remedies for Illinois crime victims should be addressed in 
a single statutory scheme.  The current statutes, including provisions on 
restitution, a state-supported compensation fund, and remedies at 
sentencing, are poorly coordinated and incomplete in their 
implementation of the constitutional right to restitution. 
II.  THE GROWTH OF CRIME VICTIM RIGHTS 
Early in United States history there was a very different criminal 
justice system.  Based on the English system, early criminal justice 
typically involved struggles between individual citizens, with emphases 
on the restoration of the victims by the offenders.6  Thus, criminal justice 
was largely driven by crime victims acting as police, prosecutors, and 
punishers.7  As there was no public prosecution, private criminal 
prosecution was usually available only to those with resources.8  In early 
English common law, justice was achieved, if at all, through corporal 
punishment of the offender by the victim or through restitution to the 
victim from the offender.9  Early in United States history similar private 
                                                 
6 Mark S. Umbreit et al., Restorative Justice in the Twenty-First Century:  A Social 
Movement Full of Opportunities and Pitfalls, 89 MARQ. L. REV. 251, 255 (2005). 
[R]estorative justice recognizes crime as being directed against 
individual people.  It is grounded in the belief that those most affected 
by crime should have the opportunity to become actively involved in 
resolving the conflict . . . .  In the years preceding [Henry I’s] decree 
[securing jurisdiction over certain criminal offenses], crime had been 
viewed as conflict between individuals, and an emphasis upon 
repairing the damage by making amends to the victim was well 
established. 
Id. 
7 Jennie L. Caissie, Passing the Victims’ Rights Amendment:  A Nation’s March Toward a 
More Perfect Union, 24 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 647, 651 (1998). 
8 Id. at 650–52.  Resources were expended for aiding assistance in arrest, investigation, 
and prosecution as well as for providing rewards for information on criminals.  JAMES 
STARK & HOWARD W. GREEN, THE RIGHTS OF CRIME VICTIMS 20 (1985). 
9 Caissie, supra note 7, at 649. 
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prosecutions occurred, with some victims hiring lawyers after initiating 
criminal charges.10 
Although the transition period is not entirely understood, a system 
of public prosecution developed11 in the late 1800s.12  As crime 
increasingly was viewed as an offense against the “community as a 
whole,”13 the victim was relegated to “alienated third party” status.14  
The diminished role of the crime victim coincided with the increased 
recognition of the rights of the criminally accused.15 
The focus on the rights of the accused was perhaps most extensive in 
the 1960s.16  As the rights of alleged criminal offenders grew through 
federal constitutional precedents interpreting various explicit federal 
constitutional provisions,17 crime victims increasingly pressed their 
interests through grassroots organizations.18  Greater public recognition 
of crime victim rights slowly developed, starting in the 1960s.19  There 
was increasing study of victimology, including explorations into 
criminal/crime victim relationships.20  Some researchers found that 
                                                 
10 Douglas E. Beloof, Weighing Crime Victims’ Interests in Judicially Crafted Criminal 
Procedure, 56 CATH. U. L. REV. 1135, 1138 (2007) (“Even after identification and arrest, the 
victim carried the burden of prosecution.  He retained an attorney and paid to have the 
indictment written and the offender prosecuted.”) (quoting William F. McDonald, Towards 
a Bicentennial Revolution in Criminal Justice:  The Return of the Victim, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
649, 652 (1976)). 
11 Caissie, supra note 7, at 652. 
12 Beloof, supra note 10, at 1146. 
13 Lynne N. Henderson, The Wrongs of Victim’s Rights, 37 STAN. L. REV. 937, 1009 (1985). 
14 Caissie, supra note 7, at 655. 
15 Id. (discussing the need to protect against vindictiveness).  See also id. at 652 
(discussing the need to insulate those criminally charged from “irrational private 
prosecutions”). 
16 Henderson, supra note 13, at 943. 
From the post-World War II period to the mid-1960s, liberal theories 
were ascendant, with respect to both the social welfare approach to 
crime prevention and offenders and the classic liberal ideology of 
protecting the individual from the overreaching power of the state.  
Liberals emphasized the social origins of crime—poverty, alienation, 
lack of education, discrimination—and sought to remedy these 
perceived causes of crime.  They advocated rehabilitation, rather than 
punishment, of convicted criminals.  And they sought to protect the 
constitutional rights of the accused, finding a responsive majority in 
the United States Supreme Court. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
17 Caissie, supra note 7, at 655. 
18 Henderson, supra note 13, at 949–50. 
19 MARLENE YOUNG & JOHN STEIN, THE HISTORY OF CRIME VICTIMS’ MOVEMENT IN THE 
UNITED STATES 2 (2004), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/ncvrw/2005/pdf/ 
historyofcrime.pdf. 
20 Id. 
Parness et al.: Monetary Remedies for Victims During Illinois Criminal Cases
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2009
72 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44 
victims often chose not to report crimes because of their “disillusionment 
with the system.”21 
As crime rates soared, a get-tough attitude on crime also gained 
momentum.22  There was some backlash to the judicial focus on the 
rights of the accused.23  The plight of crime victims became important to 
those supporting prosecutors in the criminal justice system.24 
In this setting, a movement to better compensate crime victims arose.  
In particular, increased opportunities for compensation were thought to 
facilitate greater cooperation by otherwise reticent witnesses.  Most 
compensation programs were need-based.25  Over time, however, crime 
victim compensation schemes were increasingly based on “a justice 
orientation.”26 
Crime victims’ rights also gained support from the emerging 
women’s movement.27  Proponents sought to change the way female 
crime victims were treated, especially in sexual assault and domestic 
abuse cases.28  In fact, two of the earliest crime victim assistance 
                                                 
21 Id. 
22 Henderson, supra note 13, at 945–46. 
The decline of support for liberal approaches and the inability of 
liberals to solve the apparent paradoxes created by their beliefs left the 
crime issue to the conservatives.  Conservatives pointed to the failures 
of liberal programs and emphasized that crime was a matter of 
individual choice and wickedness.  They adhered to the “crime 
control” model of criminal justice that emphasizes “efficiency” in the 
criminal process . . . .  Central to the ideology of the crime control 
model are “the presumption of guilt” and the belief “that the criminal 
process is a positive guarantor of social freedom.” 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
23 Conservatives believed that bad actors were getting off on “legal technicalities” 
because of the exclusionary rule and Miranda rights.  Id. at 948. 
24 Id. at 948–49. 
25 Award of compensation was dependent upon victims’ cooperation with police and 
prosecutors.  YOUNG & STEIN, supra note 19, at 2. 
26 Id. 
27 Henderson, supra note 13, at 949. 
[B]y the middle of the 1970s different groups began to focus their 
attention on the victims of particular crimes.  For example, the 
women’s movement did much to emphasize the plight of rape victims 
in the legal process, while the more recently formed group, “Mothers 
Against Drunk Driving” . . . brought the victims of drunk drivers to 
public attention.  The success of these groups concerned with 
particular crimes and crime victims served to highlight the general 
importance of “victims” as an effective political symbol. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
28 YOUNG & STEIN, supra note 19, at 2. 
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programs were “rape crisis centers.”29  These programs demonstrated 
that victims were often mistreated by  criminal justice professionals.30 
Crime victim activism was further boosted by organizations 
established by survivors of homicide victims, including Mothers Against 
Drunk Driving and Parents of Murdered Children.31  In 1975, the 
National Organization for Victim Assistance began to coordinate efforts 
on behalf of crime victims.32  In 1981, crime victims were aided when 
President Ronald Reagan instituted a National Victims’ Rights Week.33 
Crime victim activism shifted to the states toward the latter part of 
the twentieth century.  California enacted laws providing compensation 
for crime victims in 1965 and then “became the first state to establish 
state funding for victim assistance in 1980.”34  In 1980, Wisconsin became 
the first state to approve a statutory crime victims’ Bill of Rights.35  
Efforts continued elsewhere to become more responsive to crime 
victims.36  By 1990, several American states had some form of a Bill of 
Rights provision for crime victims.37  A more recent tally found there 
were more than 32,000 statutes nationwide addressing crime victim 
rights.38  It was in this setting that certain crime victim rights were 
constitutionalized in Illinois in 1992. 
III.  THE ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO CRIME VICTIM RESTITUTION 
In Illinois, a proposed constitutional Crime Victim’s Rights 
amendment was placed on the ballot in November 1992, after approval 
by the House on a 117-0 vote and after overwhelming approval by the 
Senate.39  The change was suggested by then-Illinois Attorney General 
                                                 
29 Id. at 3. 
30 Id. at 2. 
31 Henderson, supra note 13, at 949–50. 
32 YOUNG & STEIN, supra note 19, at 5. 
33 Id. at 6. 
34 Id. at 2, 5. 
35 Id. at 5.  See also WISC. CONST. art. I, § 9m (noting that effective in 1993, the State shall 
“ensure” varying “privileges and protections” for crime victims). 
36 See Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of State 
Constitutional or Statutory Victims’ Bill of Rights, 91 A.L.R.5TH 343, 362–63 (2001). 
37 YOUNG & STEIN, supra note 19, at 8. 
38 Id. 
39 Tim Novak, Crime Victims’ Bill of Rights is Supported by House 117-0, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, April 23, 1992 at 6A.  The Senate vote was forty-nine yes, one no, and four 
voting present.  State of Illinois, 87th General Assembly Regular Session, Senate Transcript, 
Apr. 30, 1992, at 18. 
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Roland Burris.40  When the amendment passed, over a dozen other 
American states had already spoken constitutionally on crime victims.41  
The Illinois initiative was intended to elevate crime victims in order to 
partially level the playing field with criminal defendants and to give 
crime victims a more significant role in the criminal justice system.  
Opponents protested that the amendment was a waste of time, as there 
could always be statutory protections.42  The Illinois amendment passed 
with over three-fourths voter approval.43  Its provisions, now in Section 
8.1 of Article I, say in part: 
SECTION 8.1.  CRIME VICTIM’S RIGHTS. 
(a) Crime victims, as defined by law, shall have the 
following rights as provided by law: 
(1) The right to be treated with fairness and respect 
for their dignity and privacy throughout the 
criminal justice process. 
(2) The right to notification of court proceedings. 
(3)  The right to communicate with the prosecution. 
(4) The right to make a statement to the court at 
sentencing. 
(5) The right to information about the conviction, 
sentence, imprisonment, and release of the accused. 
(6) The right to timely disposition of the case 
following the arrest of the accused. 
(7) The right to be reasonably protected from the 
accused throughout the  criminal justice process. 
(8) The right to be present at the trial and all other 
court proceedings on the same basis as the accused, 
unless the victim is to testify and the court 
determines that the victim’s testimony would be 
materially affected if the victim hears other 
testimony at the trial. 
(9) The right to have present at all court 
proceedings, subject to the rules of evidence, an 
                                                 
40 Victims’-Rights Measure on Illinois Referendum, http://www.illinimedia.com/di/ 
archives/1992/November/2/victimsright.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2009) [hereinafter 
Illinimedia]. 
41 Rights of Victims, supra note 1. 
42 Illinimedia, supra note 40. 
43 The vote was 2,964,592 for and 715,602 against.  Illinois Constitution — Amendment 
Proposed, http://www.ilga.gov/commission/lrb/conampro.htm (last visited June 8, 
2009). 
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advocate or other support person of the victim’s 
choice. 
(10) The right to restitution.44 
Besides defining crime victims45 as well as the ten enumerated rights, 
the General Assembly is also expressly authorized to “provide by law for 
the enforcement” of the rights46 and to provide for their funding, 
including the imposition of assessments against criminal defendants.47  
So, the Illinois constitutional right to restitution is quite dependent upon 
state legislators.  But legislative discretion is not boundless given the 
strong support in the constitutional convention and with the voters.48 
Illinois General Assembly responsibility for explicit constitutional 
rights is not limited to crime victims.  Elsewhere, legislation plays a 
variety of roles in the development of constitutional law.  Constitutional 
claims that can be pursued directly in court cases without legislative 
authorization involve self-executing rights.  Article I, Section 17 of the 
Illinois Constitution has a self-execution clause, declaring that certain 
antidiscrimination rights “are enforceable without action by the General 
Assembly,” though legislation may establish reasonable exemptions and 
provide additional remedies.49  Enforcement by lawsuits, absent any 
enabling legislation, is thus contemplated. 
When a constitutional right is accompanied by a self-execution 
clause, Illinois courts have entertained claims in the absence of enabling 
legislation.  In Baker v. Miller,50 a claimant alleged sex discrimination in 
employment,51 relying on Section 17 of Article I which states: 
All persons shall have the right to be free from 
discrimination on the basis of race, color, creed, national 
                                                 
44 ILL. CONST. art I, § 8.1(a). 
45 See ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 24 (“crime victims, as defined by law”); CONN. CONST. 
art. I, § 8 (“a victim, as the general assembly may define by law”).  Cf. ARIZ. CONST. art. II, 
§§ 2.1(C), 2.1(A)(8) (defining “victim” who has a right to receive “prompt restitution”). 
46 ILL. CONST. art. I, § 8.1(b).  See also CONN. CONST. art. I, § 8 (restitution enforceable as 
“provided by law”).  Cf. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(b)(13)(B) (“Restitution shall be 
ordered . . . in every case . . . in which a crime victim suffers a loss.”). 
47 ILL. CONST. art. I, § 8.1(c). 
48  Compare CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(b)(13), OR. CONST. art. I, § 42, and R.I. CONST. art. I, 
§ 23 (constitutions silent on role of legislature in crime victim restitution), with S.C. CONST. 
art. I, §§ 24(A), 24(A)(9) (“[V]ictims of crime have the right to . . . receive prompt and full 
restitution.”), and id. at § 24(C)(3) (“The General Assembly has the authority to enact 
substantive and procedural laws to define, implement, preserve, and protect [the right to 
restitution], including the authority to extend [the right] to juvenile proceedings.”). 
49 ILL. CONST. art. I, § 17. 
50 636 N.E.2d 551 (Ill. 1994). 
51 Id. at 552–53. 
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ancestry and sex in the hiring and promotion practices 
of any employer or in the sale or rental of property.  
These rights are enforceable without action by the 
General Assembly, but the General Assembly by law 
may establish reasonable exemptions relating to these 
rights and provide additional remedies for their 
violation.52 
The court held that because of the self-execution clause, legislation was 
unnecessary for the claim to proceed.53  But the court also found that any 
monetary remedies were limited by the General Assembly’s “reasonable 
exemptions” found within the Illinois Human Rights Act.54  In Baker, the 
claimant was without a damage remedy for unconstitutional 
discrimination because her employer was exempted under the Act.55 
Illinois constitutional rights involving discrimination, within Section 
18 of Article I, were reviewed in Teverbaugh v. Moore.56  There, a seventh-
grade student and her mother sued a school district for sex 
discrimination by two male students.  Section 18 declares there shall be 
no sex discrimination by “units of local government and school 
districts.”  Section 18 mentions neither self-execution nor General 
Assembly action.  The appellate court held that any recovery must come 
under the Human Rights Act.57  It further found the Act contained no 
claim for discrimination occurring in primary or secondary schools.58  
The court compared Section 18 to Section 17, focusing on the words 
used59 as they provide the best indication of drafter intent.60  Additional 
bases for interpretation can appear, of course, in legislative or 
constitutional convention debates, as well as in conduct surrounding the 
“first legislative action” following the adoption of a constitutional 
provision.61  While Section 17 states that “[a]ll persons shall have the 
                                                 
52 ILL. CONST. art. I, § 17. 
53 Baker, 636 N.E.2d at 553. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 554 (employer had fewer than fifteen employees). 
56 724 N.E.2d 225 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000). 
57 Id. at 230 (“[I]t is incumbent upon the Illinois legislature to acknowledge a right of 
action under the Human Rights Act.”). 
58 Id. (“[W]e are aware that the Human Rights Act does not expressly recognize a right 
of action for damages under the circumstances contemplated in this case.”). 
59 Id. at 229. 
60 Id. (“The comparative texts of . . . section 17 . . . and section 18, evidence that where 
the drafters intended to provide a right of action for damages for discrimination, they 
purposely included language to effect such a result in the absence of implementing 
legislation.”). 
61 See Bd. of Educ. Sch. Dist. No. 142 v. Bakalis, 299 N.E.2d 737, 744 (Ill. 1973) (analyzing 
the legislative action of Article VIII in the Illinois Constitution). 
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right to be free from discrimination” and that “[t]hese rights are 
enforceable without action by the General Assembly,”62 Section 18 only 
says “equal protection . . . shall not be denied.”63  In comparing Sections 
17 and 18 and examining Baker, the Teverbaugh court found that the 
Section 18 drafters did not intend an automatic private right of action,64 
concluding that where drafters use different language, they usually 
intend different results.65 
Constitutional rights were also at play in AIDA v. Time Warner where 
a claimant sought declaratory relief because the defendant’s television 
show, The Sopranos, “breache[d]” the individual dignity clause.66  That 
clause says in full, in Article I, Section 20:  “To promote individual 
dignity, communications that portray criminality, depravity or lack of 
virtue in, or that incite violence, hatred, abuse or hostility toward, a 
person or group of persons by reason of or by reference to religious, 
racial, ethnic, national or regional affiliation are condemned.”67  The 
AIDA court found Section 20 was completely “hortatory.”68  It relied on 
the earlier Irving v. Marsh case where the court looked to the legislative 
history, specifically a Bill of Rights Committee Report, which stated: 
“[Again [Victor Arrigo, the provisions supervisor] want 
to reiterate, the individual dignity clause in no way 
qualifies or modifies the constitutional rights of free 
speech and press.]”  The provision creates no private right 
or cause of action . . . .  It is purely hortatory, “a 
constitutional sermon.”  Like a preamble, such a 
provision is not an operative part of the Constitution.  It 
is included to serve a teaching purpose, to state an ideal 
or principle to guide the conduct of government and 
individual citizens.69 
So a constitutional condemnation of certain conduct can be “merely an 
expression of philosophy and not a mandate that a certain remedy be 
provided in any specific form.”70 
                                                 
62 ILL. CONST. art. I, § 17. 
63 Id. § 18.  “The equal protection of the laws shall not be denied or abridged on account 
of sex by the State or its units of local government and school districts.”  Id. 
64 Teverbaugh, 724 N.E.2d at 229. 
65 Id. 
66 772 N.E.2d 953, 956 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002). 
67 ILL. CONST. art. I, § 20. 
68 AIDA, 772 N.E.2d at 961. 
69 Id. (citing Irving v. Marsh, 360 N.E.2d 983, 984 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977)). 
70 Id. 
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However, deference to the General Assembly on enumerated 
constitutional rights does not always follow the Teverbaugh approach.  
The right to remedy for all wrongs and the rights regarding eminent 
domain, within Article I, Sections 12 and 15, use the “as provided by 
law” language twice, while the same phrase appears four times in 
Section 8.1.  Crime victim rights seemingly require a more foundational 
role for the General Assembly.  The persons entitled to the rights in 
Sections 12 and 15 are “every person” and, impliedly, owners of 
property taken by eminent domain.  Section 8.1, by contrast, references 
“crime victims, as defined by law.”  As well, Sections 12 and 15 
enunciate some very particular protected rights, and then allow these 
protections “as provided by law.”  This suggests the chief legislative 
responsibility is enforcement of the provisions.  Section 8.1 on crime 
victims differs, as it says “the following rights as provided by law,” 
indicating that the rights themselves as well as their enforcement can be 
defined legislatively. 
Notwithstanding significant General Assembly authority, the Illinois 
constitutional crime victim restitution right could be judicially deemed 
to provide by itself opportunities for crime victim recoveries.  In Rhode 
Island there is the constitutional declaration that a “victim of crime shall, 
as a matter of right . . . be entitled to receive from the perpetrator of the 
crime, financial compensation for any injury or loss caused by the 
perpetrator of the crime, and shall receive such other compensation as 
the state may provide.”  In 1998, in Bandoni v. State,71 the Rhode Island 
Supreme Court heard a case where a crime victim sued the criminal for 
negligence, urging rights afforded both by legislation and the 
constitution.72  The court held that although the constitution had 
mandatory terms, the crime victim compensation right was not self-
executing.  As there was no language requiring the General Assembly to 
act, the court held that the lack of a statutory enforcement scheme meant 
the crime victim had no claim.  The dissent in Bandoni concluded, 
however, that as a general proposition, specific constitutional rights 
should be “presumed to be judicially enforceable absent an express 
textual negation of such a presumption or a demonstrable textual 
commitment of this remedial function to another coordinate branch of 
government.”73  The dissent reasoned that if there was no judicial 
enforcement absent enabling legislation, criminals could harm victims 
with fewer  repercussions.74  The dissent concluded that the majority 
                                                 
71 715 A.2d 580 (R.I. 1998). 
72 Id. at 583–84. 
73 Id. at 602 (Flanders, J., dissenting). 
74 Id. at 603. 
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effectively allowed a legislative veto of a strong constitutional right,75 
opining that where drafters intend no lawsuits they directly say so.76 
Illinois case precedent suggests that Illinois courts would not follow 
the Bandoni dissent on Section 8.1 restitution claims.  The Illinois crime 
victim restitution right is not self-executing, as victims are “defined by 
law” and the enumerated rights are “as provided by law.”  Under 
Teverbaugh, the absence of self-executing language would mean no intent 
to recognize a claim independent of General Assembly action.  The long 
history of statutory mechanisms for crime victim recoveries in Illinois, 
even if not comprehensive, further suggests that any new or expanded 
crime victim remedies require legislative action.  Yet given that crime 
victim restitution is now a constitutional right, expressly enumerated, 
restitution should not be subject to absolute legislative whims.  There 
should be minimally adequate remedies available.  Restitution is not 
hortatory.  Unlike the constitutional provision in AIDA, crime victim 
restitution is an enumerated right.  It is not simply a ban on certain 
conduct.  It is more than a “constitutional sermon” or a “teaching” tool.77 
So, what do the Illinois statutes now say about monetary remedies 
for crime victims, including the constitutional restitution right?  Do they 
sufficiently implement the intentions of the drafters and of the electorate 
to have at least some crime victim monetary remedies?  How do the 
Illinois statutes compare to statutory crime victim remedies elsewhere in 
America?  And, are there models that Illinois legislators could employ to 
secure better restitution, and perhaps other monetary remedies, for crime 
victims in line with the strong intentions to aid crime victims under 
Section 8.1? 
IV.  ILLINOIS STATUTES ON RESTITUTION, COMPENSATION, AND OTHER  
MONETARY REMEDIES FOR CRIME VICTIMS 
Within the Illinois constitution, the only express crime victim 
monetary remedy is restitution.  As noted, such restitution significantly 
depends on General Assembly action, but it was never intended to be the 
sole monetary remedy available to crime victims.78  Before and since 
1992, the Illinois General Assembly has had, and has exercised, the 
authority over monetary remedies beyond crime victim restitution.  
                                                 
75 Id. at 604. 
76 Id. at 616. 
77 Contra AIDA v. Time Warner Entm’t Co., 772 N.E.2d 953, 961 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002). 
78 In fact many of the Section 8.1 constitutional rights had predecessors in statutes.  
Illinimedia, supra note 40.  Yet, restitution had not been addressed by statute before Section 
8.1 was adopted.  ILL. STAT. ch. 38, § 1404 (1991) (current version at 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
120/4 (2008)). 
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Today there are three distinct statutory schemes on monetary recoveries 
for crime victims.79 
A. Restitution 
In Illinois, the crime victim restitution right expressly recognized in 
the Illinois constitution invites significant General Assembly action.  This 
right, together with the other new constitutional Crime Victim’s Rights 
of 1992, are now addressed in the Rights of Crime Victims and Witnesses 
Act (“Victims and Witnesses Act”).80  The 1984 predecessor to this Act, 
known as The Bill of Rights for Victims and Witnesses of Violent Crimes 
Act, did not include a right to restitution.  The stated purpose of the 1984 
law was “to ensure the fair and compassionate treatment of victims and 
witnesses of violent crime . . . who are essential to prosecution.”81  The 
1984 version was later amended to address notice to victims upon 
request of any plea agreements, appeals, and post-conviction reviews 
sought by offenders.82  In 1989, the State’s Attorney was newly 
mandated, upon the request of victims, to forward victim impact 
statements to the Prisoner Review Board.83 
Following adoption of Section 8.1, the carryover 1984 provisions 
were placed in the Victims and Witnesses Act.84  The purpose statement 
of the new legislation, enacted in 1994, included the goal “to implement, 
preserve and protect the rights guaranteed to crime victims by Article I, 
Section 8.1.”85  The ten rights listed in Section 8.1, including restitution, 
were expressly addressed in the new scheme.86  A new statutory section 
was added to include the procedures (formerly there were only the 
rights themselves) for implementation.  In particular, Section 4.5(b) of the 
Act says:  “The office of the State’s Attorney . . . shall request restitution 
                                                 
79 See generally Katlin McKelvie et al., Sentencing Guidelines, 88 GEO. L.J. 1483, 1553–59 
(2000) (analyzing a brief history of statutory crime victim restitution in the federal district 
courts and reviewing the Victims and Witnesses Protection Act of 1982, the Crime Control 
Act of 1990, and the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996). 
80 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 120/1 (2008) (an earlier crime victim’s rights statute, effective 
1984, was amended, effective 1994, to reflect new Illinois constitutional provisions on crime 
victims). 
81 ILL. STAT. ch. 38, § 1402 (1985) (current version at 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 120/2 (2008)). 
82 ILL. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 1404(6), (8)–(9) (1987) (current version at 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
120/4 (2008)). 
83 ILL. STAT. ch. 38, § 1404(23) (1989) (current version at 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 120/4 
(2008)). 
84 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 120/1 (1994). 
85 Id. at 120/2. 
86 Id. at 120/4. 
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at sentencing and shall consider restitution in any plea negotiation, as 
provided by law.”87 
Sections 4.5 and 6 of the Act also address other rights within Section 
8.1, with the exception of the “right to timely disposition of the case.”  
Section 4.5 specifically includes provisions on notice to victims of court 
proceedings,88 the availability of “social services and financial 
assistance,”89 and the rights to have a “translator present,”90 
“appropriate employer intercession services,”91 and assistance in the 
prompt return of stolen property.92  These had all been included in the 
rights section of the 1984 statute, as had the right to present a victim 
impact statement at sentencing.93  The 1994 Act added the right to have 
an advocate or support person present at all court proceedings (the ninth 
right in Section 8.1).94  It also made the victim’s constitutional right to 
communicate with the prosecution more meaningful by requiring that, 
upon victim request, the State’s Attorney shall “where practical, consult 
with the crime victim” prior to offering a plea or negotiating a plea 
agreement.95  As well, with the adoption of Section 8.1, there were new 
provisions on such matters as the use of a “[p]rivately operated crime 
victim and witness notification service,”96 a “[s]tatewide victim and 
witness notification system” established by the Attorney General,97 and 
the creation of a toll-free number for victims to provide input for parole 
hearings.98  The 1994 statute also added new processes for courts to 
consider victim impact statements on possible aggravation or mitigation 
relevant to plea proceedings.99  Other than adding the restitution right 
itself and mandating that the State’s Attorney request it, the 1994 statute 
said nothing else about restitution.100 
                                                 
87 Id. at 120/4.5(b)(11). 
88 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 120/4.5(c) (2008) (“[a]t the written request of the crime victim”). 
89 Id. at 120/4.5(b)(3). 
90 Id. at 120/4.5(b)(7). 
91 Id. at 120/4.5(b)(5). 
92 Id. at 120/4.5(b)(4). 
93 ILL. STAT. ch. 38, ¶¶ 1404 (6), (10)–(14), (16) (1985) (current version at 725 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. 120/4 (2008)); ILL. STAT. ch. 38 ¶ 1406 (1985) (current version at 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
120/6 (2008)). 
94 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 120/4(a)(9) (1994). 
95 Id. at 120/4.5(c)(4) (1994). 
96 Id. at 120/8 (1999). 
97 Id. at 120/8.5(a) (2000). 
98 Id. at 120/4.5(f) (2003). 
99 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 120/6(b) (1994). 
100 The Act now says that it does “not limit any rights . . . otherwise enjoyed 
by . . . victims . . . of violent crime, nor does it grant any person a cause of action for 
damages or attorneys fees.”  725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 120/9 (2008). 
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While the new statutory language could have prompted more crime 
victim restitution, it did not.  According to the website of the DuPage 
County State’s Attorney’s victims services unit, restitution is not 
guaranteed but is simply statutorily allowed.101  The DuPage County 
State’s Attorney victims services unit says to a victim that “[i]f a 
defendant is found not guilty, you may have to pursue restitution 
through civil litigation.”102  In addition, it says that if a defendant is 
ordered to pay restitution but refuses, or is unable to comply, the States 
Attorney’s Office will “attempt enforcement procedures against the 
defendant.”103  The website further notes that if a court orders restitution, 
it will be payable through the State’s Attorney’s Office or through the 
Department of Probation.104 
According to the website, restitution contemplates financial 
reimbursement to crime victims who have suffered out-of-pocket 
expenses resulting from a crime.105  Qualified out-of-pocket expenses 
include costs, losses, damages, and injuries.  The injuries can be to a 
victim’s person or to a victim’s real or personal property.  However, 
restitution does not encompass punitive damages nor does the DuPage 
County notice encompass all who are harmed by criminal acts, as it does 
not cover, for example, third parties. 
Overall, the Victims and Witnesses Act provides for pre- and post-
conviction involvement of the crime victim through notice and 
communication opportunities.  The only monetary remedy in the Act, as 
well as in the constitution, is restitution.  Section 8.1 seemingly prompted 
the General Assembly to add this remedy to its written laws and to 
mandate that the State’s Attorney request it.  Unfortunately, difficulties 
persist in securing more complete crime victim recovery.  Problems also 
arise when monetary remedies beyond restitution are sought or when 
remedies are sought by third parties. 
B. Compensation 
In addition to restitution, since 1973 the Illinois General Assembly 
has provided to victims of violent crimes opportunities for compensation 
under the Crime Victims Compensation Act (“Compensation Act”).106  
Under the Act, crime victims who have inadequate insurance and no 
                                                 
101 States Attorney Restitution:  DuPage County, Illinois, http://www.dupageco.org/ 
statesattorney/generic.cfm?doc_id=216 (last visited June 8, 2009) [hereinafter DuPage]. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. (emphasis added). 
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
106 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/1 et seq. (2008). 
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other funding source to cover their expenses are eligible for 
compensation for medical bills, counseling, lost wages, “loss of tuition,” 
and “funeral, burial and travel” expenses up to $5000, as well as for “loss 
of support of the dependents of the victim,” and for other expenses.107  
Illinois can provide up to $27,000 to a qualified victim.108  Compensation 
under the Act differs from restitution as it is only “a secondary 
source.”109  Awards or benefits from other sources, such as Worker’s 
Compensation, related causes of action, and insurance, will reduce the 
monies available under the Compensation Act.110 
In order to qualify for compensation, the victim must have suffered 
injury or death as the result of a “crime of violence.”111  The victim must 
also have reported the crime within seventy-two hours of its 
occurrence112 and submitted a completed application within two years.113  
Additionally, the victim must have “cooperated with law enforcement 
officials in the apprehension and prosecution of the assailant.”114  Clean 
hands are required so that the victim cannot be an accomplice.115  The 
injury must not have been “substantially attributable” to the victim’s 
“wrongful act”116 or “substantially provoked by the victim.”117 
Compensation under this Act differs from restitution where there 
usually can be a more complete remedy, and crime victim remedies 
under the Compensation Act come from the state instead of the offender.  
The jurisdiction of the Court of Claims118 is used to resolve claims, with 
funds derived from fines imposed on convicted offenders.119  The 
Attorney General is to “promulgate rules . . . investigate all 
claims . . . and represent the interests of the State of Illinois.”120  Despite 
the required notice of the right to compensation that must be given to 
                                                 
107 Id. at 45/2(h).  The compensation is reduced by the amount of health insurance 
benefits available or life insurance proceeds (with $25,000 exempted).  Id. at 45/10.1(e).  No 
showing of economic hardship is required.  Id. at 45/10.1. 
108 Id. at 45/10.1(f). 
109 Id. at 45/10.1(g). 
110 Id. at 45/10.1(e) (referring to Section 45/7.1(a)(7)). 
111 Id. at 45/2(d) (recognizing that an attempted crime of violence also counts and that 
victims include people who “personally witnessed a violent crime”). 
112 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/6.1(b) (2008). 
113 Id. at 45/6.1(a). 
114 Id. at 45/6.1(c).  But neither conviction nor apprehension is required.  Id. at 45/9.1. 
115 Id. at 45/6.1(d).  
116 Id. at 45/6.1(e). 
117 Id. 
118 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/3.1 (2008). 
119 Under the constitutional provision on crime victim’s rights, the “General Assembly 
may provide for an assessment against convicted defendants to pay for crime victims’ 
rights.”  ILL. CONST. art. I, § 8.1(c). 
120 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/4.1 (2008) (note the victim is not separately represented). 
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victims by hospitals and law enforcement agencies,121 the onus is on the 
victim to follow the statutory procedures in order to recover.122  Where 
the victim acts, however, there should be little delay in payment and no 
concern about enforcement.  While there have been some minor changes 
made since 1973, including increases in the compensation available, the 
Compensation Act has not been significantly altered since the adoption 
of Section 8.1. 
C. Monetary Remedies at Sentencing 
In addition to the Victims and Witnesses Act and the Compensation 
Act, the Illinois Unified Code of Corrections (“Corrections Code”)123 has 
permitted monetary remedies for crime victims at sentencing since 
1977.124  The current Code states the criminal court “in all convictions for 
offenses in violation of the Criminal Code of 1961 . . . shall order 
restitution” where the victim sustained personal injury or property 
damage “as a result of the criminal act of the defendant.”125  In other 
cases, the court at sentencing must “determine whether restitution is an 
appropriate sentence.”126 
In its original version, the law simply noted certain procedures “[i]f 
restitution is part of the disposition.”127  It also declared the defendant’s 
ability to pay restitution as a factor in determining amount.128  Prior to 
the adoption of Section 8.1 in 1992, the Corrections Code was amended 
several times to increase the use of restitution at sentencing.  In 1985, the 
Code was changed to require that the court decide at sentencing whether 
restitution is appropriate,129 with the defendant’s ability to pay a factor in 
determining the method of payment,130 but not the amount.131  By 1988, 
the Code stated that the court “shall order restitution” for all convictions 
under the Criminal Code of 1961 involving victims sixty-five years or 
older.  For other cases the court would decide on the appropriateness of 
                                                 
121 Id. at 45/5.1. 
122 See id. at 45/6.1 (reporting and cooperation duties); id. at 45/7.1 (claim applications). 
123 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-5-6 (2008). 
124 The Code views victims as does the Victims and Witnesses Act, so that a parent of a 
mentally disabled victim is also a victim who can recover lost wages for attending the 
criminal trial.  People v. Fouts, 745 N.E.2d 1284, 1286–87 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001). 
125 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-5-6 (2008). 
126 Id. 
127 ILL. STAT. ch. 38, ¶ 1005-5-6 (1977) (current version at 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-5-6 
(2009)). 
128 Id. at ¶ 1005-5-6(a). 
129 ILL. STAT. ch. 38, ¶ 1005-5-6 (1985) (current version at 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-5-6 
(2009)). 
130 Id. at ¶ 1005-5-6(f). 
131 Id. at ¶ 1005-5-6(b). 
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restitution.132  Immediately following the adoption of Section 8.1, there 
were no significant amendments.133  But in 1996, the requirement that the 
victim be at least sixty-five for mandatory restitution was removed.134  
The requirement that the court determine the appropriateness of 
restitution in other cases was deleted in 1996,135 but returned in 2000.136 
Enforcement mechanisms for restitution orders under the 
Corrections Code were initially meager.  Excess cash bond could be 
applied to restitution, but this was not mandatory.137  The court was 
authorized to modify or enlarge any conditions of payment or to revoke 
the sentence.138  In 1987, language was added allowing a court to order 
the sheriff to seize and sell the offender’s property to satisfy 
restitution.139  In 1991, the court was expressly authorized to enter 
withholding orders.  As well, in 1991 a restitution order was then 
explicitly made a judgment lien in favor of the victim, enforceable as any 
other lien.140  Since 1992 the Code has declared that restitution is not 
discharged upon completion of the sentence.141  Finally, modest changes 
were made in 1998 to the civil procedure laws on interest, making them 
applicable to restitution orders.142 
The current Corrections Code requires that if restitution is ordered, 
the loss to the victim must be compensated if “proximately caused by the 
conduct of the defendant.”143  Restitution can neither include pain and 
suffering144 nor exceed actual costs.145  Besides considering restitution, 
                                                 
132 ILL. STAT. ch. 38, ¶ 1005-5-6 (1988) (current version at 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-5-6 
(2009)). 
133 Compare ILL. STAT. ch. 38, ¶ 1005-5-6 (1992), with ILL. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-6 (1994) 
(current version at 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-5-6 (2009)). 
134 ILL. STAT. ch. 38, ¶ 1005-5-6 (1997) (current version at 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-5-6 
(2009)). 
135 Id. 
136 ILL. STAT. ch. 38, ¶ 1005-5-6 (2000) (current version at 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-5-6 
(2009)). 
137 ILL. STAT. ch. 38, ¶ 1005-5-6(c) (1977) (current version at 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-5-
6(c) (2009)). 
138 Id. ¶ 1005-5-6(d). 
139 ILL. STAT. ch. 38, ¶ 1005-5-6(b) (1987) (current version at 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-5-
6(b) (2009)). 
140 ILL. STAT. ch. 38, ¶¶ 1005-5-6(m) (1992) (current version at 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-5-
6(m) (2009)) (general lien enforcement procedures are found in the Code of Civil 
Procedure). 
141 ILL. STAT. ch. 38, ¶ 1005-5-6 (1992) (current version at 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-5-6 
(2009)). 
142 ILL. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-6(n) (1998) (current version at 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-5-6 
(2009)). 
143 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-5-6(a) (2008). 
144 Id. at 5/5-5-6(b). 
145 Id. at 5/5-5-6(c)(1). 
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the Code states “the court shall determine whether the property may be 
restored in kind . . . or whether the defendant is possessed of sufficient 
skill to repair” it.146  It continues:  “the court shall allow credit” for such 
property in determining the remaining amount of restitution payable in 
cash.147  Restitution can also now be established in plea agreements, or 
even when criminal charges are dismissed.148  As an order of restitution 
is a judgment lien,149  “the court may enter an order directing the sheriff 
to seize” and sell a defendant’s property.150  If the offender fails to make 
restitution, but there is no willful violation, the court may grant an extra 
two years (above an original five)151 for a defendant to pay.152  If failure 
to pay is willful, the court may revoke the restitution order153 utilizing 
the procedures employed when revoking probation.154 
The Code has been construed liberally at times.  Thus, while the 
Code states that in “taking into consideration the ability of the defendant 
to pay . . . the court shall determine whether restitution shall be paid in a 
single payment or in installments,”155 one Illinois appellate court has 
held that the consideration of the defendant’s ability to pay is not 
required in setting the amount of restitution.156  The same court also 
noted the legislative intent “to make victims whole for any injury 
received . . . and to make criminals pay all of the costs which arise as a 
result of the injuries victims suffered.”157 
There was also a broad reading of the Code in 1992 by the Illinois 
Supreme Court in People v. Lowe.158  There, the court held that the statute 
included victims of nonviolent crime.159  It said the legislative purpose 
was “to make all victims whole”160 and to avoid the need for victims to 
pursue civil suits with “additional expense, stress and delay.”161 
                                                 
146 Id. at 5/5-5-6(a). 
147 Id. at 5/5-5-6(b). 
148 Id. at 5/5-5-6(d) (“A plea agreement . . . may require the defendant to make restitution 
to victims of charges that have been dismissed . . . and under the agreement, the court may 
impose a sentence of restitution on the charge or charges of which the defendant has been 
convicted . . . .”). 
149 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-5-6(m) (2008). 
150 Id. at 5/5-5-6(b). 
151 Id. at 5/5-5-6(f). 
152 Id. at 5/5-5-6(i). 
153 Id. 
154 Id. at 5/5-5-6(j). 
155 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-5-6(f). 
156 People v. Fontana, 622 N.E.2d 893, 903 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993). 
157 Id. at 901–02 (quoting People v. Strebin, 568 N.E.2d 420, 424 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991)). 
158 606 N.E.2d 1167 (Ill. 1992). 
159 Id. at 1173. 
160 Id. at 1171. 
161 Id. at 1173. 
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While some courts have construed the Code and the related crime 
victim statutes liberally, crime victims often still go without remedy.  
Advocates of constitutional crime victim restitution in Illinois had hoped 
for more.162  They believed that explicit constitutional recognition of 
crime victims restitution would prompt greater monetary remedies.163  
Yet to date, the monetary remedies and their processes remain 
inadequate.  Restitution remains elusive, with, at best, standardless 
discretion.  Crime victims are often left to fruitless civil lawsuits after 
criminal cases have ended.  How have other states handled monetary 
remedies for crime victims?  Can their laws provide guidance for those 
looking to enhance the constitutionally-recognized restitution right and 
additional statutory provisions on crime victim recoveries? 
V.  SECURING BETTER MONETARY REMEDIES FOR ILLINOIS CRIME VICTIMS 
Other states have strong and explicit constitutional and statutory 
rights to monetary recoveries for crime victims.164  Unfortunately, 
elsewhere as in Illinois there are many statutory and judicial failures to 
implement and enforce crime victim recovery rights.165  Yet, a few 
American laws do provide guidance on possible new laws, though no 
single state has a comprehensive scheme.  The approach elsewhere, as in 
Illinois, typically embodies three separate avenues to crime victim 
recovery:  restitution, victim compensation, and sentencing.  By 
combining these avenues into a single scheme, and by borrowing select 
provisions from other states, the Illinois General Assembly could 
facilitate greater monetary recoveries for crime victims166 and meet the 
expectations of 1992. 
                                                 
162 Illinimedia, supra note 40. 
163 Id. 
164 We particularly like the California provision that recognizes the constitutional right of 
a crime victim, intended to “secure restitution” for “all persons who suffer losses as a result 
of criminal activity,” requiring an order “in every case . . . in which a crime victim suffers a 
loss,” where all monies “collected” from criminals ordered to pay restitution “shall be first 
applied to pay the amounts ordered as restitution.”  CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(b)(13). 
165 See, e.g., Douglas E. Beloof, The Third Wave of Crime Victims’ Rights:  Standing, Remedy, 
and Review, 2005 B.Y.U. L. REV. 255, 342 (in commenting upon victims’ rights generally, 
author concludes:  “there is no way to proceed but to change victims’ illusory rights into 
real rights . . . . To become real, rights must be accompanied by victim standing, 
meaningful remedy, and review as a matter of right.”). 
166 Federal initiatives on crime victim restitution during state criminal cases are unlikely.  
See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617–18 (2000).  The Court notes: 
The Constitution requires a distinction between what is truly national 
and what is truly local . . . .  The regulation and punishment of 
intrastate violence that is not directed at the instrumentalities, 
channels, or goods involved in interstate commerce has always been 
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Monetary remedies for crime victims would be enhanced by a single 
scheme organized by the stages in a criminal case.  Thus, crime victim 
recovery laws could speak to:  (1) when a crime is being investigated; (2) 
when a prosecutor is deciding to charge; (3) plea bargaining; (4) trial; (5) 
sentencing; and (6) post conviction. 
At the investigatory stage, legislators should better ensure that 
victims become informed of their recovery rights.167  Law enforcement 
officers should be trained on the content, and on the need to explain at 
times, such rights.168  A victim advocate could be established, perhaps 
locally within every county.  Pro bono attorneys could be solicited to aid 
certain crime victims.169 
Upon the filing of a criminal charge, prosecutors, if not victims, 
should be enabled at times to preserve170 or freeze171 more assets so as to 
                                                                                                             
the province of the States . . . .  Indeed, we can think of no better 
example of the police power, which the Founders denied the National 
Government and reposed in the States, than the suppression of violent 
crime and vindication of its victims. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
167 See, e.g., 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/5.1 (2008) (requiring licensed hospitals to display 
posters about the state-supported crime victim compensation fund and mandating that law 
enforcement agencies inform victims of the compensation fund).  See also KY. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 421.500(5)(d)(2)–(3) (West 2008) (noting that the Attorney for the Commonwealth is 
to ensure a victim receives information on restitution and crime victim compensation); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 52:4B-40, 42b, 43.1 (West 2001 & Supp. 2009) (mandating the Treasury 
Department to establish Office of Victim-Witness Assistance, with information on 
compensation and restitution, as well as to provide direct services to victims, including 
food, shelter, clothing, medical, and psychiatric care). 
168 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 943.172 (2006) (law enforcement officers trained in “victims 
assistance and rights”); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-24-102 (2007) (training of law enforcement 
officers and prosecuting attorneys). 
169 John W. Gillis & Douglas E. Beloof, The Next Step for a Maturing Victim Rights 
Movement:  Enforcing Crime Victim Rights in the Courts, 33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 689, 695 (2002) 
(“[T]hrough their inherent authority, courts can appoint attorneys to act as officers of the 
court and represent crime victims on a pro bono basis.”).  See also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 13-4437 (2001 & Supp. 2008) (recognizing the right of the victim to have personal counsel, 
including counsel presence at bench conferences relevant to victim’s rights); R.I. GEN LAWS 
§ 12-28-9 (2002) (noting that within the state court system there is a victims’ services unit 
responsible for assisting victims of crimes adjudicated in the superior and district courts, 
including providing information and assistance on receiving restitution and 
compensation); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-18-14.1(c)(2) (West 2008) (establishing that an 
investigator appointed by the district attorney shall assist victims). 
170 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.11(e)(1) (1999 & Supp. 2009) (acknowledging that for 
certain criminal defendants “asset[s] . . . may be preserved . . . in order to pay restitution 
and fines”); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9728(e) (2007) (providing for the preservation of assets 
“which may be necessary to satisfy an anticipated restitution order”); UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 77-38a-601(1)(a) (2008) (noting prosecutor may act “to preserve the availability of 
property which may be necessary to satisfy an anticipated restitution order”); MONT. CODE 
ANN. § 46-18-244(5) (2007) (establishing that the prosecutor may seek restraining order or 
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facilitate later crime victim recovery.  Of course, any ex parte orders 
should be subject to quick review and all orders upon hearings should 
meet minimum procedural due process safeguards.172 
A victim’s monetary losses should also possibly be considered 
during some decision-making on criminal prosecution.  If the prosecutor 
does decide to charge, the indictment or information could include 
detailed information regarding the losses suffered by the victim.  This 
would aid later attempts at monetary recoveries.  Of course, a victim 
should not have much voice (and certainly no veto power) in decisions 
on whether and what to charge (or continue to charge).173 
During plea bargaining, repeated consultations by the prosecutor 
with a crime victim help ensure possible monetary remedies will be 
considered.  In Mississippi, for example, by law a trial court may make 
restitution a condition of accepting a plea.174  In Montana, the court must 
impose restitution upon certain pleas of guilty.175  In Alabama, a court 
will not accept a plea agreement unless the prosecutor recounts the 
reasonable efforts made to confer with the victim.176  Connecticut 
formerly permitted any victim to give an opinion before a court accepted 
                                                                                                             
other judicial action necessary to preserve assets that could be used “to satisfy an 
anticipated restitution order”). 
171 E.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/29D-65 (2008) (asset freeze in matters involving 
terrorism);  MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.532(1) (West 2009) (noting that the prosecutor can seek 
an order directing a financial institution to “freeze” assets of an account holder charged 
with a felony). 
172 A cogent argument for expanding federal judicial authority to block criminal 
defendants from transferring assets that could be used for later restitution is made in 
statement of Professor Paul G. Cassell on improving restitution in federal criminal cases.  
The U.S. House Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Crime, April 3, 2008 (source 
available with author). 
173 See, e.g., Briede v. Orleans Parish Dist. Attorney’s Office, 907 So. 2d 790, 792–93 (La. Ct. 
App. 2005).  The court noted: 
The above cited laws give the district attorney broad discretionary 
power in both instituting and handling criminal prosecutions . . . Mrs. 
Briede’s allegations do not state a cause of action against either the 
District Attorney of Orleans Parish, individually, or his office because 
the decision to take any action to prosecute or not prosecute is within 
the district attorney’s constitutionally granted powers. 
Id.; State v. Sykes, 364 So. 2d 1293, 1297 (La. 1978) (entering of nolle prosequi rests entirely 
within discretion of the prosecutor who possessed absolute discretion to dismiss 
indictment).  However, in Delaware, “[c]onsistent with the duty to represent the interests 
of the public as a whole, the prosecutor shall confer with a victim before amending or 
dismissing a charge. . . .”  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 9405 (2007). 
174 MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-15-26(2)(a)(i) (2007 & Supp. 2008) (“[r]easonable restitution”). 
175 MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-201(5) (2007) (“[S]entencing judge shall . . . require 
payment of full restitution to the victim.”). 
176 ALA. CODE § 15-23-71(1) (1995). 
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a plea.177  In Michigan, the prosecutor is to confer with the victim before 
finalizing the terms of a plea.178  In Delaware, “consistent with the duty 
to represent the interests of the public as a whole, the prosecutor shall 
confer with a victim before amending or dismissing a charge or agreeing 
to a negotiated plea or pretrial diversion.”179  We support legal reforms 
that require criminal prosecutors to consult with crime victims 
specifically about potential monetary recoveries, as well as laws that 
prompt trial judges entertaining plea arrangements to inquire about such 
consultations. 
Victims would also be aided in their pursuit of monetary remedies if 
a criminal defendant was required, at times, to make certain financial 
disclosures as components of guilty pleas.180  In California, in 
anticipation of a restitution order, a criminal defendant must make a 
financial disclosure.181  In Alaska, certain financial disclosures are now 
required of defendants upon conviction.182  In Illinois only certain 
victims183 of adjudicated crimes have statutory rights to depose the 
convicted criminals (or others with “reasonable grounds to know”) 
about the assets of criminals.184 
At sentencing, after trial, a crime victim seeking recovery can 
participate in varying ways.  There could be a victim impact statement or 
a required proof of loss claim.  In Alaska, the prosecutor must inform a 
crime victim of the right to make a victim impact statement showing 
losses, the need for monetary relief, and recommendation as to the 
sentence.185  In Colorado, a prosecutor must present a victim impact 
                                                 
177 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-91(c) (repealed 1976). 
178 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 780.756(3) (West 2007). 
179 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 9405 (2007). 
180 See also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 56.13 (Vernon 2006) (mandating that 
mediation services for victims and offenders be provided by volunteers trained by Texas 
Department of Criminal Justice); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-11.4 (West 2008) (recognizing that a 
victim-offender reconciliation program can lead to submissions to sentencing courts on 
damages to victims under proposed restitution agreement).  Delaware expressly allows for 
creation of victim-offender mediation as an alternative to the criminal justice process.  DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 9501 (2007).  Minnesota invites restorative justice programs.  MINN. 
STAT. ANN. § 611A.775 (West 2009). 
181 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1202.4(f)(5) (Supp. 2009). 
182 ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.045(j) (2008). 
183 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 145/2.3 (2008) (cases involving persons “killed or physically 
injured” in Illinois as a result of crimes “perpetrated or attempted against” those persons). 
184 Id. at 145/3(a) (cases involving persons convicted, or found not guilty by reason of 
insanity or guilty but mentally ill, “of first degree murder, a Class X felony, or aggravated 
kidnapping”).  See also id. at 145/3(b) (“[U]pon written request of the victim, The 
Department of Corrections shall notify the victim of any assets of the person 
convicted. . . .”). 
185 ALASKA STAT. § 12.61.015(b) (2008). 
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statement itemizing any economic loss, including losses after criminal 
charges were filed.186  Where a conviction in a criminal case necessarily 
entails a defendant’s responsibility for certain pecuniary harm, such a 
determination should be deemed conclusive at sentencing (and 
elsewhere via issue preclusion) when monetary remedies are pursued.187 
After sentencing, new laws could ensure better recovery of monetary 
remedies secured by court orders.  Courts should be prompted to 
monitor compliance.  The Authors like the Georgia law, stating that 
court clerks or probation or parole officers are statutorily mandated to 
report regularly on the failures by offenders to pay restitution.188  Once 
certain sentencing order violations become known, crime victims should 
have statutory standing to seek relief189 so they need not rely on 
prosecutorial discretion.  We also especially like the new California 
constitutional provision that not only recognizes a crime victim’s right to 
restitution,190 but also requires a restitution order “in every case, 
regardless of the sentence or disposition imposed, in which a crime 
victim suffers a loss.”191  This California provision further states:  “[a]ll 
monetary payments, monies, and property collected from any person 
who has been ordered to make restitution shall be first applied to pay the 
amounts ordered as restitution to the victim.”192  Seemingly, this 
somewhat limits government collections in forfeiture proceedings.193  In 
                                                 
186 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-11-102(1.5)(b) (West 2008). 
187 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-18-75 (1995) (“If conviction in a criminal trial necessarily 
decides the issue of a defendant’s liability for pecuniary damages for a victim, that issue is 
conclusively determined as to the defendant, if it is involved in a subsequent civil action.”).  
Thus, there should be no defense of lack of mutuality as the crime victim would not be 
bound, though the criminal defendant would be bound. 
188 GA. CODE ANN. § 17-14-14(c) (West 2008). 
189 For example, Indiana grants “standing” to victims to assert crime victim rights.  IND. 
CODE ANN. § 35-40-2-1 (West 2004). 
190 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(b)(13).  The victims are broadly defined, including “all 
persons” who suffer related losses as a result of criminal activity leading to conviction.  Id. 
§ 28(b)(13)(A). 
191 Id. § 28(b)(13)(B). 
192 Id. § 28(b)(13)(C). 
193 Forfeitures of crime-related property to government is governed, inter alia, in Illinois 
by several statutes.  See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/10A-15 (2008) (forfeitures relating to human 
trafficking and involuntary servitude); id. at 5/11-20 (obscenity case forfeitures); id. at 5/11-
20.1A (juvenile prostitution and child pornography forfeitures); id. at 5/16-20 (forfeitures of 
unlawful communication or access devices); id. at 5/29B-1(h) (money laundering 
forfeitures); id. at 5/36-1 (forfeitures of vessels, vehicles, and aircrafts); id. at 5/37-2 (liens 
upon public nuisances); id. at 5/37.5-5 (forfeitures relating to animal fighting); id. at 550/12 
(forfeitures relating to cannabis); id. at 570/405.2 (streetgang criminal drug conspiracy 
forfeitures); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT, 150/1 (2008) (drug asset forfeitures); id. at 175/1 
(narcotics profits forfeitures).  See generally Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442 (1996) 
(analyzing federal constitutional guidelines on state forfeiture abatement actions involving 
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Illinois, a statute only speaks expressly to “attachment against the 
property” of the convicted criminal when the prosecution involved “first 
degree murder, a Class X felony, or aggravated kidnapping.”194  Finally, 
we support a new Illinois statute allowing crime victim awards to be 
enforced at any time.195 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
When Illinois voters added the Crime Victims’ Bill of Rights to the 
Illinois Constitution in 1992, they anticipated significant new benefits for 
crime victims, including increased opportunities for restitution.  
Although the amendment has spurred some new statutes, many crime 
victims in Illinois still have little chance for restitution or other monetary 
remedies during criminal cases.  One could argue, perhaps, that the 
restitution right should be self-executing, thus allowing direct civil 
actions.  For us, a better path to restitution, and to other monetary 
remedies, for crime victims would be for the Illinois General Assembly 
to establish a new comprehensive remedial scheme.  Integrated 
approaches to monetary remedies for crime victims, speaking to the 
varying stages of the criminal process, would help better secure the goal 
of enhanced recoveries by crime victims established in 1992 by 
overwhelming majorities of both legislators and voters.  The 1992 
initiative should finally prompt changes in the Victims and Witnesses 
Act, the Compensation Act, and the Corrections Code so that more 
Illinois crime victims receive more monetary relief during Illinois 
criminal cases. 
                                                                                                             
property employed during a crime); William James Haddad, Challenging Property Seizures 
Under Illinois Civil Asset Forfeiture Law, 92 ILL. B.J. 365 (2004) (reviewing Illinois civil asset 
forfeiture proceedings). 
194 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 145/3(c) (2008). 
195 See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-108(a) (2008) (“Child support judgments . . . may be 
enforced at any time.”). 
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